Quality of education is a determining factor in a nation's competitiveness. In order to compete globally, Mexico will have to raise its standards beyond its current low achievement. Several innovations at federal and state levels have been developed to raise the quality of basic education through teachers' professional training, new learning presence in schools, and to improve teachers' working and salary conditions. This paper examines teachers' incentives and their impact on students' learning achievement. The first part of this paper shows that early in their professional lives teachers in basic public schools are better paid than other comparable groups. The second part of this paper finds that some incentives for teachers at the school l evel improve learning achievement. For instance, it seems that teachers' enrollment in the Carrera Magisterial program has a positive effect on students' learning achievement. Further, teachers' training is most effective when targeted toward increasing teachers' practical experience and developing content-specific knowledge.
MAIN ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

INTRODUCTION
Although one of the major education policy goals of many Latin American countries, including Mexico, is to achieve universal basic education, and there has been tremendous progress toward this goal, school quality is still a major concern. School quality has not kept pace with enrollment increases, and an increasing number of children, especially poor children and those living in rural areas are being educated in l ow quality schools. As a result there is grade repetition and low academic achievement (OREALC 1998) .
In spite of the relative growth in research literature on the differential effect of education inputs on student achievement, the results have been a matter of considerable debate. While in developed countries education inputs seem more important than socioeconomic origin to explain achievement, in developing countries the contrary seems to be the case -family background is more important than school and teacher characteristics in explaining achievement. In spite of some inconsistencies, the literature for developing countries indicates that education inputs have a significant effect on academic achievement (Lockheed and Verspoor 1991; Schmelkes and Tepepa 1999) . Most of these studies focus mainly on material inputs and largely exclude education process indicators. Teaching methods, classroom and school management, and the involvement of the principal have generally not been researched (Martin 2000) .
Undoubtedly, at the core of an effective learning process in school is a good teacher (Flyer and Rosen 1997; Ruiz 1999) . How they teach and motivate students and what they teach them lies at the heart of the learning production process. Students learn better when they are taught by teachers who teach clearly; that is, teachers who can explain concepts clearly, who have a good working knowledge of their subject matter, and who are able to answer students' questions intelligently (Galchus 1994) .
In general, the literature reviewed finds that the factors, which have been identified in international studies regarding basic education teacher effectiveness, are for the most part absent from Mexican classrooms (Schmelkes 2000) . Teachers do not make detailed lesson plans; higher order thinking is not stimulated; reading comprehension and writing abilities are not adequately taught; there is very little cooperative learning and individualized attention; time is not used optimally; and the teachers are very much left to their own devises and receive little academic support from their superiors (though support from fellow teachers seems to be more common). In Mexico teachers in many schools are also said to suffer from a lack of collegial work, school support for effective teaching, feedback, and accountability. These are key factors and their importance on school effectiveness has been underlined by local and international research. Part of the reason for this deficiency is that informal rules governing schools leave teachers very much on their own in the classroom. On the one hand, there is little control of what goes on inside. On the other hand, teachers get very little classroom support. They receive very little support from the principal, who is afraid to intrude into a space that is virtually considered to be the teacher's sacred domain. Supervisors rarely visit schools, and when they do they hardly ever visit classrooms or make pedagogical recommendations. In-service training opportunities are scarce, particularly in rural areas. Although most teachers say they read, what they read rarely relates to pedagogical issues (Schmelkes 1997; World Bank 2000) .
Schmelkes ' (1997) Teachers do not always master their subject matter. It cannot be assumed that a teaching certificate is a guarantee that the teacher has the required knowledge of all the primary school learning objectives. Teachers in general are not adequately trained in effective teaching practices. The predominant teaching model is centered on the teacher, geared towards the class as a whole, based solely on the textbook as a source of information and practice, and aided by the blackboard as the sole teaching aid. It is obvious from this study that teachers in general have few ideas on how to deal with a multi-grade situation and few seek to promote pupil participation. Still fewer are those who know how to handle special learning difficulties. Group work by pupils is very rare. The exploration of community resources as learning material and as a source of educational experience is almost completely absent. Pupils' learning experiences are monotonous, and mainly consist in reading from the textbook and copying in the notebook or doing exercises dictated by the teacher. Importance is hardly ever attached by teachers to reasoning, problem-solving, and the application of knowledge to everyday life situations.
In pursuing the long-term goal of improving students' learning achievement in Mexico, this paper examines teachers' incentives and professional development in schools in Mexico. Such incentives include non-monetary benefits offered to teachers such as extrinsic motivators and also monetary benefits. Direct monetary benefits include salary and allowance offered to teachers. Indirect monetary benefits include all other resources provided to teachers. Measures of professional support include training, teacher's guides, didactic material, instructional supervision, and monetary incentives. Non-monetary incentives refer to parents and students' perception of the teacher's work, choice of location for a teacher's and ne xt assignment (type of post).
This paper is divided into the following sections: Section 2 briefly describes the current structure of the education system in Mexico. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 examines whether teachers are underpaid in Mexico. Section 5 measures the impact of school factors on students' performance. Section 6 offers conclusions.
BACKGROUND
Within the Mexican education system, basic education is the government's highest priority. The basic education system consists of: (a) early childhood education (or preschool), which is optional for children from 3 to 5 years old; (b) mandatory primary education, ideally for children aged 6 to 12, but due to late enrollment and grade repetition it is targeted at children aged 6 to 14; and (c) mandatory lower-secondary school education, consisting of a 3-year cycle, and intended for children aged 12 to 16.
The Mexican government is the predominant provider of basic educational services. National Union of Workers in Education (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, SNTE). All teachers in upper-secondary and tertiary education have a union of professors and administrative workers also affiliated with SNTE or are independent (autonomous or state Universities).
The Mexican educational system has become highly centralized in the hands of the Federal Government. This centralization is reflected by the growing share of federal schools in total enrollment, which rose from 64 percent in 1970 to 72 percent in 1990. In May 1992, however, the states, the federal government structures, and the SNTE signed the National Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education (Acuerdo Nacional para la Modernización de la Educación Básica, ANMEB). This agreement was created in response to demand for a decentralized educational system. This agreement should allow states to have more participation. Previous attempts to decentralize the educational system have failed due to constraints on the state and federal government structures and to opposition from the SNTE. The ANMEB is part of a long process that yielded satisfactory results until May 1992, when the Federal Government, State Governors, federal agencies, and the SNTE signed the agreement (Secretaría de Educación Pública, SEP, 1998).
This program had three main objectives. The first was associated with the reorganization of the educational system, which consisted in the transfer of the Education Sector, formerly administered by the Federal Government, to the States. The transfer included 513,974 teachers, 116,054 administrative posts, 3,954,000 hourly-salaries, 1.8 million pre-school students, 9.2 million primary students, 2.4 million secondary students, and 22 million different materials.
The second objective was the reformulation of regional educational content, in which states received the authority and the right to propose changes. Proposals are evaluated by the SEP and, if accepted, they are included in the Free Textbook system (Sistema Nacional de Libro de Texto Gratuito) . In this respect, the role of the states is to propose content, while the federal government decides and puts the proposal into practice.
The last objective, the revaluation of teaching activities, consisted in launching the Carrera Magisterial, for teachers of basic education and members of the Union. Overall, the objective was to improve teachers' welfare through better salaries and housing policies. 3, 4 In this context, the federal government modified its educational discourse, placing more emphasis on the quality of educative content instead of the previous focus on educational coverage.
The creation of the Carrera Magisterial in 1992 as part of the ANMEB was aimed
at raising the quality of basic education through teachers' professional training, a new learning presence in schools, and by improving working conditions. One component of this program is the training of teachers; another is a merit payment system in which professional staff are voluntarily evaluated and rewarded with salary increases for their performance as classroom teachers, school directors-supervisors and administrators (técnico-pedagógicas).
The evaluation is based on experience (10 points), professional skills (28 points), educational school level (15 points), and completion of accredited courses (17 points). In the case of teachers' performance in school, 30 points are given to student's learning achievement and professional performance.
3 The appendix reviews the educational decentralization process in Mexico. 4 The ANMEB aimed at reorganizing the educational system through a process of administrative decentralization, as well as a revision of the basic educational program and the production of adequate textbooks. In accordance with this agreement, the Federal Government transferred the control and management of the basic education schools to the state governments. The 1992 agreement carried with it only a very limited idea of decentralization. Still, the Federal Government remains responsible for general policies and standards (normative and policy-making functions), teachers' formation and allocation, textbook production, evaluation and monitoring, and the provision of financial resources needed to ensure proper coverage and quality of the educational system. Moreover, Federal education transfers to the states remain earmarked for specific purposes. In 1998 the government passed the 1998 Law on Fiscal Coordination, which gave the states greater discretion in the use of Federal education and other transfers.
As with principals and supervisors, 30 points are given to school performance and professional achievement. Teachers in the third area (tercera vertiente) obtain 30 points for educational support. All the teachers in any one of the following modalities are considered as candidates for the program: initial education, basic education, indigenous schools, and lower-secondary education via television ( telesecundaria). There are five levels of promotion ("A", "B", "C", "D", "E"). The salary rewards allocated to each represent a salary increase but do not represent a change in the type of post assigned to the teacher. The amount assigned to each of these levels is a considerable increase with respect to the number of hours worked in the initial post. According to the General Direction of Evaluation (SEP), 21 percent of a teacher's total salary at Level "A" comes from the Carrera Magisterial program. The Carrera Magisterial contributes 38, 51, 61, and 68 percent to a teacher at Level "B," "C," "D," or "E," respectively. The promotion ladder attaches considerable importance to seniority within this program, posts or teaching jobs in under-developed areas. Once teachers get the Carrera Magisterial benefit, it is extremely rare that they lose it. If teachers retire, they cannot be promoted within the Carrera Magisterial unless assigned to administrative tasks (técnico-pedagógicas). 
DATA
ARE TEACHERS' UNDERPAID?
Teacher salaries have often been highlighted as a very important issue in discussions on school improvement (Mitchell and Peters 1988; Komenan 1990; Cox 1993; Chapman 1993; Lankford and Wyckoff 1997; Liang 1999) . The level and structure of teacher remuneration is said to affect their morale and their ability to focus on and devote adequate time to teaching well. It could also determine the capacity of the education system to attract and retain good teachers (Popkewitz and Lind 1989; Psacharopoulos and Valenzuela 1996) . This section explores if teachers are underpaid. Workers in the ENIGH were classified into four occupational groups: teachers in basic public schools (which includes teachers in primary public schools as well as teachers in secondary public schools), teachers in basic private schools (which includes teachers in primary private schools as well as teachers in secondary private schools), other government workers (which contains all the other occupational public groups, excepting teachers, with 12 years of formal schooling or more), and private sector workers (workers in the private sector, except for the agricultural group workers and the low-skilled group workers, with 12 years of formal schooling or more). These two latter groups were chosen in order to provide close comparison. Separate ordinary least squares regressions were computed for both groups of teachers and for the comparable groups. The analysis uses hourly labor earnings as the dependent variable and years of schooling, gender, region (urban-rural), experience (defined as age-years of schooling-6), and experience squared as explanatory variables.
Estimates are presented in the following table. These results indicate how returns to different factors vary among all four occupational groups. Teachers in basic public schools have lower returns to years of schooling than other government workers or private sector workers-while basic public teachers have a return of 5.8 percent for an additional year of schooling, the private sector workers and the other government workers have returns of 16.8 percent and 12.8 percent, respectively. Differences between urban and rural areas might be a key issue from the social point of view. As one can see in the table above, the public sector does not face a regional discriminatory problem, because public employees in rural areas earn similar wages to those in urban areas. Nonetheless, a private sector worker in urban areas earns 45.2 percent more than a private sector worker in rural areas.
Another advantage of running separate regressions is that differences in the earning gradients can be estimated over the life cycle of teachers (public and private) versus the other occupational groups. Additionally, earnings variation over life cycle by occupational groups can be evaluated to analyze whether labor earnings dispersion is low or high. Figure   1 shows income profiles for teachers in basic public and private schools, other government workers, and workers in the private sector. This graph assumes a constant level of schooling (15 years), male and urban workers.
Figure 1
Source: Author's estimates based on ENIGH 1996 Teachers in basic private schools face the most uncertainty about lifetime salary and job tenure. Nevertheless, they earn more than public school teachers and the other groups.
Teachers' labor earnings in basic public school profiles are slightly flatter than the income profile for the private sector workers. At the initial stage of their professional life, teachers are paid about 79 percent more per hour than private sector workers, and about 77 percent more than other government workers. However, as can be seen in Figure 1 , public teachers' earnings grow at a slower rate than in comparable occupations. Note that other government workers' wages grow at a significantly higher rate than public teachers' salaries. Other government workers face significant risk throughout their professiona l life, possibly due to the uncertainty of obtaining retirement benefits and the lack of a civil service career in the public sector. Nevertheless, the public teachers' union has been effective in stabilizing teachers' jobs and salaries. Once a public school teacher enters the labor market, the union not only protects his or her position, but also protects his or her lifetime income.
THE EFFECT OF SCHOOL FACTORS ON STUDENTS' PERFORMANCE
Mexican education literature is rich in ethnographic studies of schools in various parts of the country (Tirado 1999; Martin 2000) . In contrast, there are hardly any econometric studies that quantify the effects of school factors or teaching practices on student learning. There are some econometric studies, among others World Bank (1999) and World Bank (2000), but they are also limited to a few states. This section presents a national/urban/rural and public/private analysis of the EEEP measuring students'
performance. The purpose here is to test certain hypotheses regarding the determinants of student learning. These hypotheses relate to the effects of school quality, particularly teachers' income, experience, training, teaching practices, and teachers' incentives at the school level. Issues regarding supervision, facilities, and specific students' characteristics and their parents' are also considered in the analysis.
Based on the EEEP, Table 2 shows the distribution of the Spanish and Mathematics test scores by school quintiles. The best 20 percent schools in the nation ha ve a score of 57.7 on average in Mathematics (out of 100 points) and a relatively higher score in Spanish.
The standard deviation is higher in this group compared to the rest of the learning achievement quintiles. The highest grade dispersions are concentrated at the tails of the distribution. Table 4 shows classroom size by stratum, which can be taken as a measure of relative school productivity among stratum. Surprisingly, indigenous schools perform better in this indicator than community schools given that the scoring difference between them is not significant. However, classroom size does not differ significantly between private urban schools and public urban schools although variance is greater in the latter. Tables 5 and 6 below show the distribution of students by learning achievement quintiles. About 45 percent of students in private urban schools are enrolled in the top quintile of schools, compared to only 6.4 percent of the students from indigenous schools, which has the highest percent of students enrolled in the bottom quintile of Mexican schools. These results are more pronounced in Spanish, since 61.4 percent of the students in private urban schools are enrolled in the best 20 percent of schools, compared to only 4.0 percent of the students from indigenous schools, which also have the highest percent of students enrolled in the lowest 20 percent.
The distribution of students enrolled in public urban schools is evenly distributed across quintiles. The distribution of students in public rural schools is biased toward the lowest quintile. Which primary school characteristics contribute the most to student learning in a multivariate model? How do these school variables h ave an effect on learning achievement? The models below attempt to answer these questions. In each model, the school, socioeconomic characteristics, and teachers' characteristics are the same. Model 1 (with school dummies):
Model 2 (with school variables):
The two models are estimated separately for the urban and rural areas as well as nationally. This attribute enables us to estimate the overall mean of achievement, and determine the deviations of the students' scores and of the school's averages around that mean. The second model fully captures the students' effects through adding students' socioeconomic variables to the empty model. γ k The deviations of achievement of the "k" school around the overall average.
The deviations of students' scores around the overall average. Source: Author's estimates using the Primary Education Assessment, second round 1997, SEP.
(2) Model 2 with school dummies and students' characteristics:
In order to have greater precision in the estimation of the students' effects on the learning achievement, several relevant variables were introduced at the student level, including student's gender, age, pre-school educatio n, repetition of fifth grade, teacher's performance, student's attitude toward learning, household size, household's income, household utilities, number of books in house, number of rooms in house, parent's schooling level, parent's expectations of the student's educational achievement, and parent's opinion of educational services in the school. The variables were entered individually to test whether the coefficients remained robust and significant. The model is described by the following equation: γ k The deviations of achievement of the "k" school around the overall average conditioned on students' characteristics.
ε ij The deviations of students scores around the overall average. The advantage of this model is that it provides extensive information about the sources of variation that constitute the R -squared. At the national level, the student socioeconomic variables explain 27.7 percent of the total variation. This is understandable, because almost all explanatory variables are categorical. Notice that this set of socioeconomic student variables explains more than 52 percent of the variation among schools but only explains 1.7 percent of the students' variance. In urban areas, the explanatory power of the socioeconomic variables is similar to that of the national level.
The introduction of these variables has several effects. It reduces in absolute terms the variance among schools (from 24.54 in model 1 to 11.55 in model 2) because individuals are less heterogeneous. The variance component ratio of school effect from model 1 to model 2 dropped by 18 percent percent, implying that the variance component ratio of student effect increased by 69 percent. Thus, schools appear to be more similar (homogenous) taking into consideration students' characteristics, but the differences among schools (heterogeneity) remain relatively important. The explanatory power of the student variables is much lower for rural areas than for urban areas. These variables explain only 29.1 percent of the total school variance and 2.5 percent of the student variance.
This analysis also weighed student socioeconomic profile. Males and females achieve equally in mathematics. Age and grade repetition have a significantly negative impact on mathematics achievement. These students achieve lower grades than others.
Repetition has been associated with low achievement and school dropout (Schmelkes 1997 ). Pre-primary school level is not significant for mathematics test scores, possibly because parents infrequently participate in their children's learning achievement.
Additional work is needed to establish the links between initial education, parents' participation, and learning achievement. Nonetheless, the results show that the development of self-driven and studious students who seek information beyond textbooks is a key factor in increased learning achievement. How to develop good learning habits and motivation among students should be a challenge not only to teachers but also to parents.
Teacher's pedagogical behavior (efforts and performance in the classroom) is of great importance in grading learning achievement. The impact of this variable is much greater than the impact of other school factors, such as didactic material available to the teacher. Students learn better when they are taught by teachers who teach clearly (that is, explain concepts clearly), who have a thorough knowledge of the subject matter, and who are able to handle students' questions and doubts intelligently (Ruiz 1999; Santos 1999; Schmelkes 1997 Schmelkes , 2000 .
Students in households with higher per capita income or family assets achieve higher scores. In addition, there is a strong positive relationship between a mother's schooling level and children's learning achievement in urban areas and, conversely, a father's schooling level and student achievement in rural areas. This finding is consistent with Tirado (1990) . It was also found that the quality of educational services has a considerable positive impact on learning achievement.
(3) Model 3(with student's socioeconomic index, and school and dummy variables).
Conditioned on the socioeconomic student's profile, the model below estimates the impact of school variables on student achievement scores. Accordingly, model 3 is described by the following equation: 
I i
Vector of student's socioeconomic index.
Z j Matrix of schools variables.
d k
The dummy variables that indicate schools in the sample.
ε ij The deviations of students' scores around the overall average. Table 9 presents an estimation of model 3 at the national level. In general, students with teachers who have more years of experience (using age as a proxy) achieve higher scores in mathematics. It is clear that teacher experience and seniority improve student achievement growth rates, suggesting that teacher proficiency is enhanced by practical experience and training. The marginal productivity of time spent in formal education of teachers on teacher effectiveness is statistically insignificant. However, the potential of training to contribute to the improvement of teaching effectiveness appears to be high. The following findings show: the importance of teachers' experience and practice; teacher ability to deal with children's questions and doubts intelligently (implying the importance of teachers' subject matter knowledge), and teacher effectiveness in monitoring students' performance or difficulties and talking to students.
Female teachers increase learning achievement. Interestingly, training (measured by the number of courses taken by the teacher) has not influenced student achievement.
Moreover, each one of these courses separately failed to have an impact on learning achievement. Thus, investment in primary school teachers seems most effective when targeted toward increasing practical experience and developing content-specific knowledge.
Teacher's years of residence in the community increases students' achievement, possibly because of the teacher's involvement with the community. Type of post (short term) has a negative impact on learning achievement. Teacher's years of schooling failed to demonstrate significant effects on student learning, which is expected since there is little variance in the level of schooling. A teacher's income has no significant effect on learning achievement, but many studies have found that teacher's salary is a poor predictor of a student's achievement (Figlio 1997; Martin 2000) .
Frontline educators feel that problems relating to school infrastructure and facilities negatively affect teaching effectiveness and student learning achievement (World Bank 1999 and 2000) . Their foremost recommendation for raising school quality is to address this inadequacy. To what extent this recommendation will actually lead to student learning achievement is questionable. Some studies in other countries show that improvement in school infrastructure can have a significant positive impact on student learning. However, the EEEP data do not appear to support this hypothesis.
Teacher's pedagogical efforts show a positive and significant marginal effect on learning achievement. Pedagogical effort and teacher answers to student questions are highly correlated with greater learning achievement. Other work or secondary activity does not affect a student's test scores, possibly because only a small proportion of fifth grade teachers have a secondary occupation. A large number of public school teachers, however, have two or more posts. As part of ANMEB, teachers have at least two posts, one at the primary school level and another at the lower-secondary school level. Didactic materials available to the teacher failed to demonstrate a significant effect on learning achievement.
An additional important variable to explain learning achievement in public schools was school supervision by the principal and supervisor. The frequency of school visits by supervisors has a significant and positive correlation with student learning. Students in schools with a high degree of supervision on the part of the school principal achieve better scores. Thus, differences in school organization and management could be important for student achievement. It is also consistent with the PARE experience, which indicates that the quality of supervisors and the frequency of their school visits had significant and positive effects on student test scores (World Bank 1998). The type of post assigned to the teacher (short term) has a negative impact on learning achievement (mathematics test scores), particularly in urban areas.
Additionally, the impacts of each explanatory variable in elasticity terms were computed in order to compare the quantitative effects among all explanatory variables. As can be seen in Table 9 , variables with the highest elasticity values include supervision, teacher's enrollment in the Carrera Magisterial, and teacher's interest in students' learning.
It is possible that there is a Carrera Magisterial self-selection problem. The relationship observed between a student's learning and his or her teacher being in a Carrera Magisterial may occur because of the self-selection problem. That is, teachers who join the Carrera Magisterial are likely to see themselves as highly effective teachers and are likely to be so, and so they have a high probability of being rewarded. In order to avoid a possible self-selection problem, the standard Heckman's Methodology was applied to the Carrera Magisterial self-selection problem. The probit equation for computing the Mill's ratio was specified as follows:
Defining v j =1 if the jth teacher is in Carrera Magisterial and v j =0 otherwise.
Geographical variables as state and stratum, as well as classroom size, teacher's characteristics, and school's characteristics explain this probability. "Teacher's opinion about Carrera Magisterial program" is proposed as the trigger variable for measuring the differences in the application of this program, which might affect the probability of participation. The probit estimation results are shown in A.3. Selectivity bias turned out to be significant only in urban areas.
Results from the multivariate regression model show that at the national level and particularly in rural areas, enrollment in the Carrera Magisterial has a positive impact on learning achievement. Note that being in the Carrera Magisterial program increases a student's achievement in mathematics by 1.87 percent (3.31 percent in rural areas-see Table B .1). However, the level in Carrera Magisterial is negatively correlated w ith learning achievement. Ultimately, the program may have good components that promote better teaching practices, but there is a pervasive incentive affecting teacher promotion.
Results show that a large share of teachers in basic education is relatively old and work in administrative tasks.
Furthermore, the EEEP data show that 62.8 percent of the teachers in the sample are enrolled in the Carrera Magisterial. In addition, there is no significant difference in test score distribution between students with a teacher in the Carrera Magisterial and students without such a teacher. Tables 11 and 12 present the distribution of test scores for those students who have a teacher enrolled in Carrera Magisterial and those with a teacher not enrolled in Carrera
Magisterial, nationally and by stratum. Since there is no significant difference, one might infer that there is no selection bias with teachers in Carrera Magisterial getting the best students and other teachers getting worse students. Students in rural schools with a teacher in the Carrera Magisterial achieve slightly better scores than their peers (Table 12 ). In public urban schools, there is no significant difference, but in the case of indigenous schools there is a significant difference. Few teachers in private urban schools report being enrolled in the Carrera Magisterial. This could be a result of a sampling error, or because a teacher works at both public and private schools.
CONCLUSIONS
Several interesting findings arose in this paper. First, real salaries and labor earnings for teachers in basic public education are significantly above those from other occupations and groups. Secondly, teachers in basic public schools face a lower risk and uncertainty of having their standard of living reduced (measured as labor income). In other words, once teachers enter the labor market as public school teachers the union not only protects their position but also protects their flow of income throughout their lifetime. Thus, salary increases for public school teachers is not likely to be a crucial factor on recruiting and retaining better teachers in the public schools.
The second part of this paper analyzes the determinants of students' learning achievement. Using multivariate analyses the results show that student socioeconomic variables explain 27.7 percent of the total scores' variation. Whereas this set of variables explains more than 52 percent of the variation among schools, it explains only 1.7 percent of the student-level variation. On the one hand, for urban areas, the power of explanation for these variables is similar to the power for national level areas. On the other hand, the predictive power of these variables is much lower for rural areas. The school level variation in the outcome scores reflects the socioeconomic student variables to a great extent.
However, some of the remaining within-school variation might be explained by other explanatory variables. Another remarkable result is that although the inclusion of student variables significantly reduces the variance component ratio of schools, this ratio remains relatively important.
On the part of the school, the models estimated consistently showed that teacher's and supervisor's variables are important in explaining students' learning achievement. It was found that a teacher's type of post (short term) has a negative impact on learning achievement. Therefore, a review of the rules for defining this kind of post needs to be done in order to provide the right signals to the short-term teachers. Teacher's years of schooling and income failed to demonstrate significant effects on student learning. On the contrary, teacher's pedagogical efforts show a positive and significant marginal effect on learning achievement. Pedagogical effort and teacher answers to student questions are highly correlated with greater learning achievement. Didactic materials available to the teachers and school facilities failed to demonstrate a significant effect on learning achievement.
Students in schools with a high degree of supervision on the part of the school principal achieve better scores.
Indicators of organizational and management differences among schools need to be implemented in order to evaluate how the organization of these schools (with a high degree of supervision) affects student achievement. Teacher training, as measured by the number of courses taken by the teacher, does not have a significant impact on student achievement.
Moreover, each one of these courses separately failed to ha ve an impact on learning achievement. Thus, investment in primary school teachers seems most effective when it is targeted to increasing practical experience and developing content-specific knowledge.
Finally, teacher enrollment in the Carrera Magisterial program had a positive relation with learning achievement. The bottom line here is that this incentive program might have some good aspects that could possibly promote better teaching practices.
However, a complete assessment of Carrera Magisterial should not be made only on the basis of whether it helps to pay the good teachers better and to retain them, but also on whether it pushes bad teachers to improve. Testing this assessment will require a data panel of teachers, linking teachers' pay to the rate of growth (not the level) in their students' grades in standardized tests. 
APPENDIX The National Agreement for the Modernization of Basic Education
The decentralization process intended to create a state agency that would receive all the federal resources. In previous attempts to decentralize the educational system, the Federal Government, through the SEP, established state delegations that were in charge of some administrative functions. These units were in charge of the reception of the federal educational system. Gradually the delegations gained new responsibilities and administrative power that facilitated the negotiation of the ANMEB with the states and the SNTE. These delegations created a new political setting where state union leaders and teachers started to gain power and, as a result of political negotiations, many new parties were allowed to enter. This participation and the internal struggles in the SNTE weakened the rigid structure that had opposed the previous decentralization programs. Each state had a different situation before and after the agreement, as we can see in the next This table shows that the states responded in different ways to the decentralization process, making it either easier or harder, depending on their abilities to absorb their new functions and responsibilities. The coexistence of different agencies makes the process harder because sometimes teachers belong to different sections of the SNTE, and each section struggles to control the teaching posts in the new state educational agencies. Another problem was the standardization of social benefits, because the differences between the states and federal levels made it almost impossible for the government to cover these differences. The delegation and reception of responsibilities were as follows: Responsibilities of the Federal Government after the ANMEB • Operative: Provide educational services in the Federal District.
• Normative: Elaborate the legal framework that rules the basic educational system.
• Administrative: Transfer of the basic educational system to the states and setting up the agreements.
• Financial: Provide compensatory expenditures (the latter through federal agencies such as CONAFE) to the most underdeveloped regions to eliminate inequities between states and regions.
• Evaluative: Establish the evaluation procedures for the national educational system.
• Formulative: Plan the educational system, authorize, and periodically review the free textbooks.
• Financial: Allocate fiscal resources among the states through federal transfers.
• Precautionary: Supervise the proper use of the resources allocated to the states in cooperation with state agencies.
Responsibilities of the State Governments after the ANMEB • Operative: Directly provide the educational service.
• Normative: Guarantee labor rights and social benefits to the transferred workers. To issue state educational laws.
• Administrative: Create public organisms for receiving the transferred system and integrate both systems into a single agency. Establish agreements.
• Financial: Allocate increasing resources in real terms to basic education.
• Evaluative: Design a state evaluation system.
• Formulative: Propose regional contents for the programs in basic education.
Responsibilities for Municipalities after ANMEB
• Operative: Promote and provide educational services within territories.
• Administrative: Establish agreements to coordinate or unify educational services.
• Financial: Provide resources for school maintenance and equipment.
TAX COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS
In order to maintain the states' new responsibilities concerning the administration of the educational system, it was necessary to complement the ANMEB with a transfer of resources that could make those objectives feasible. Despite its strategic importance, the transfer of resources has not always been clear and has had different impacts on each state.
Certain states complain because they contribute more to the federal government than they receive from it. Furthermore, the levels of government also include municipalities, which have different attributes and obligations, making it difficult to establish rights on the use and collection of taxes.
In Mexico, the tax collection scheme follows these rules:
The federal government is solely responsible for the collection of the following taxes: ISR (Tax on rents); Tax on assets; IVA (Tax on consumption); IEPS (Special taxes on production and services), and taxes on exports and imports. The States are responsible for the collection of: Taxes on the use of vehicles; Taxes on patrimonial transference (inheritances); Taxes on notaries and judicial business; Taxes on Transactions not subject to IVA; Taxes on public shows; and, Taxes on payrolls. Municipalities are responsible for the collection of: Prevail (a property tax) and Taxes on public services (garbage collection, sewage, water, etc.). 
EDUCATIONAL FINANCING
State Expenditures
The decentralization process meant that both levels of government (state and federal) had to be responsible for the educational financing. This meant that states had to increase the use of their own resources because their expenditure was much smaller than the Federal expenditures. However, the proportions that the two levels of government had to contribute for financing education were undefined. As a result state governments have increased state expenditures on education to different degrees. Another problem is that states do not have a clear and consistent classification of the funds they use on education. There is also insufficient information about state spending at each level. Although some states have increased their expenditures on education, most expenditures go on the payroll, and there are still many states that have not increased their own participation, depending to a greater extent on the federal transfers and participation. If decentralization increases, states would be able to spend more money on specific programs to increase the quality and coverage of education, depending to a lesser extent on the Federal Government.
Federal Expenditure
The organization and administration of federal expenditures on education has changed recently, as a result of the 1998 reforms in the Law of Fiscal Coordination. In this reform, Ramo 33 was created to complement the new official policy for a new federalism. Starting from the assumption that the State Government is more efficient in the provision of some services (including educational services and the importance of improving the provision of these services), the SHCP organized a new scheme on how to finance these sectors.
Before the reform, the Federal Government channeled the resources for education to the states through Ramo 25 (Contributions to Basic Education) and Ramo 26 (Previsions for Salaries). Ramo 11 is the channel to transfer funds for the maintenance of the SEP and has not been changed. With the creation of Ramo 33 in 1998, federal expenditure on education became part of a package of resources intended for education, health services, and infrastructure.
Reform and Allocation Criteria
The 1998 The basis for these negotiations has two criteria:
• Irreducible Expend iture: This part is based on the number of students, teachers, and schools that each state has at the beginning of an academic year. According to this number, the SEP allocates a certain amount that can maintain the functions of the whole state educational system including some resources for general services, materials, and personnel services.
• New necessities: Toward the end of the academic year, each state negotiates more funding with the SEP in order to cover the new necessities created by an increased demand for educational services or by the increased offer of teachers for the following academic year. Here, states can ask for more resources if they want to implement a specific program. Only states that satisfy SEP criteria for the creation of new locations will receive the necessary increment of resources. These criteria are established in the Booklet of Detailed Programming (Manual de Programación Detallada) for the preschool, primary, and lower-secondary levels.
After receiving each state's proposal, the SEP analyzes the increment viability in federal transfers for education, then sends its Expenditure Budget Proposal to the SHCP, which is the last opportunity for government denial or approval.
There are some resources that might be used for education but are not part of Ramo 33. These resources are classified under different items and most are still administered by the federal government: 1. The Fund for the Administrator Committee of the Federal Program of Schools Construction (CAPFCE). 2. The National Council for Educational Promotion (CONAFE). In the case of the CAPFCE, a new process of decentralization has been taking place since 1998. The committee has been transferring funds to states and municipalities so that they can be responsible for the construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of schools in pre-school and lower-secondary. State governments are already responsible for primary schools, and the idea is that they will eventually be responsible for all levels of education.
The decentralization process is far from complete, since there are states with two organisms taking care of the educational system with duplicity of functions. This situation implies a fiscal cost that is beyond the scope of this study, but which future research should analyze. To facilitate the administration and provision of the services as well as the gathering of educational statistics and the integration of policies, it would be preferable to have a single agency to direct the educational system. Just one agency in each state could make the educational supervision an easier task as long as the functions of this organism are well defined. The efficiency of this organism largely depends on an adequate use of resources. The latest reforms in the allocation of funds tend to prevent their misallocation, which themselves are not sufficient.
It is also important for states to be able to raise funds from other sources (private investments or savings) generated from the correct administration of funds. If states are largely dependant on resources transferred by the federal government, it is harder for them to allocate resources to areas or programs, which are different to the payroll. States must avoid this situation so as to be able to fund specific projects to improve the quality of educational services, developed by them, according to their particular needs. To this extent, the states would become really autonomous-otherwise decentralization would be merely administrative. 
